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4.1 Introduction
The development of the modern investment treaty regime is emblem-
atic of the post–Second World War period in international law. With the
increasing ‘legalization of world politics’, international legal institutions
have shifted structurally from a classic model of co-existence to an inter-
national law of cooperation.1 This structural shift is exemplified by a num-
ber of key features such as the expansion of treaty law, the multiplica-
tion of actors subject to international law and the emergence of novel
adjudicatory mechanisms for resolving international legal disputes. Such
legalization of global affairs has also precipitated a backlash from some
states claiming that the proliferation of international law is undercutting
national sovereignty and marginalizing the political manoeuvrability of
states at the international level.
All of these features are apparent in the international treaty regulation
of foreign investment. Largely built on a network of more than 3500 bilat-
eral investment treaties (BITs) and regional free trade agreements (FTAs),2
a handful of plurilateral investment treaties,3 as well as customary
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1 Chapter 1, this volume.
2 UNCTAD provides an extensive database on international investment agreements, http://
investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA (accessed 16 May 2017).
3 Such treaties include the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), Chapter 11 of the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Association of South-East Asian Nations Compre-
hensive Investment Agreement.
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international law,4 foreign investors are granted beneficiary rights aimed
at the post-establishment protection of their investments. It has been
claimed that ‘no other category of private individuals’ is ‘given such
expansive rights in international law as are private actors investing across
borders’.5
These developments, like other areas of international law, were viewed
in teleological terms: an ever-expanding pattern of treaties and cus-
tom that, even if fragmented, would increasingly constrain domestic
sovereignty for the greater good of global governance. Success was thus
defined as the ‘victory of the supra- or multi-national over the parochial
national’.6 Yet, this assumption of path dependency and evolutionary
progress is risky. While the rules and institutions determined by politics
are ‘stickier’ than those determined in economic markets,7 they can shift
decidedly over time in the reverse direction. If political contestation was
present during the formation of any institution or rule, it is not axiomatic
that it will disappear afterwards. Moreover, even when such seminal polit-
ical contestation was not present, a regime’s trajectory or external devel-
opments may engender new forms of political contestation.
In this respect, we should not be surprised that some states have
reasserted themselves in their role as treaty-makers and overall regime
shapers. Commonly referred to as a legitimacy crisis,8 the international
investment regime is under attack, with even some prominent ‘insid-
ers’ expressing disquiet.9 Primarily, however, this phenomenon is not
solely about the expansiveness of the substantive rights granted to foreign
investors under international investment agreements (IIAs), but rather
the combination of such rights with the robustness of their investor–state
4 Patrick Dumberry, ‘Are BITs Representing the “New” Customary International Law in
International Investment Law?’ (2010) 28(4) Penn State International Law Review 675–701.
5 Beth Simmons, ‘Bargaining over BITS, Arbitrating Awards: The Regime for Protection and
Promotion of International Investment’ (2014) 66World Politics 12–46, at 42.
6 Jose Alvarez, ‘The Return of the State’ (2011) 20 Minnesota Journal of International Law
223–64, at 223.
7 Paul Pierson, ‘Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics’ (2000) 94
American Political Science Review 251–67.
8 Michael Waibel, Asha Kaushal, Kyo-Hwa Chung and Claire Balchin (eds), The Backlash
against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality (The Hague: Kluwer Law, 2010); for
an overview, seeMalcolm Langford, ‘CosmopolitanCompetition: The Case of International
Investment’ in Cecilia Bailliet and Katja Aas (eds), Cosmpolitanism Justice and Its Discon-
tents (New York: Routledge, 2011), 178–204.
9 See, inter alia, contributions in Jean Kalicki and Anna Joubin-Bret (eds), Reshaping the
Investor-State Dispute Settlement System: Journeys for the 21st Century (The Hague: Brill,
2015); and Roberto Echandi and Pierre Sauvé (eds), Prospects in International Investment
Law and Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
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dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions and the increasing number and
range of states subject to disputes.With over 850 known investment treaty
arbitrations (ITAs) initiated to date,10 as well as an unknown number of
instances in which the threat of ITA has been used as a bargaining tool,
states hosting foreign investors are increasingly finding themselves hav-
ing to defend their domestic laws and policies before and in the shadow
of international arbitral tribunals.
Such a backlash would not have occurred without the existence of the
remedial right granted to foreign investors (a private individual or corpo-
ration). Claims can be directly brought by them against the state host-
ing their investment. The litigation has resulted in sizeable compensa-
tion awards for actions that many states believe are both legitimate and
within their exclusive purview as sovereigns.11 This tension between the
rights afforded to foreign investors under IIAs and the legitimate rights
of sovereign states to regulate in the public interest of their domestic
citizenry has arguably resulted in a single overarching strategy being
employed by certain states dissatisfied with the international investment
regime. It is the reassertion of sovereign control by limiting legally or effec-
tively the international legal rights granted to foreign investors. Aswe shall
see, this strategy is almost always employed by states that have been sub-
ject to at least one dispute;12 and has been labelled the ‘return of the state’
by one investment law scholar.13
For those states dissatisfied with the practice of the international invest-
ment regime, the strategic importance in reasserting sovereign control
10 PluriCourts Investment Treaty Arbitration Database (PITAD), https://jus-pitad01.uio.no/
(accessed 16 May 2017). Not all ITAs are public, and many awards remain confiden-
tial. Awards that are public are made available at www.italaw.com/ (accessed 16 May
2017). Our estimate is that less than 20 per cent of ITA awards are not in the public
domain.
11 See, inter alia, David Collins, ‘Loss Aversion Bias or Fear of Missing Out: A Behavioural
Economics Analysis of Compensation in Investor–State Dispute Settlement’ (2016)
8(3) Journal of International Dispute Settlement 460–82. See also Daniel Behn, ‘Legiti-
macy, Evolution, and Growth in Investment Treaty Arbitration: An Empirical Evalua-
tion of Recent Decisions’ (2015) 46(2) Georgetown Journal of International Law 363–415
at 373–75.
12 Lauge Poulsen and Emma Aisbett, ‘When the Claim Hits: Bilateral Investment Treaties
and Bounded Rational Learning’ (2013) 65(2) World Politics 273–313; but compare with
Wolfgang Alschner, ‘The Impact of Investment Arbitration on Investment Treaty Design:
Myth versus Reality’ (2017) 42(1) Yale Journal of International Law 1–66, where the author
finds that the incidence of ITA claims do not in and of themselves trigger changes in IIA
design.
13 Alvarez, note 6 above.
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over this area of international law is justified by claims that ITA over
the last decade has been lop-sided, biased against states and constitutes
an unacceptable delegation of sovereign authority and control to interna-
tional adjudicators.14 However, the precise reasons for the backlash vary
amongst states and there are competing explanations. There is arguably
a complex set of instrumental calculations, intrinsic beliefs and back-
ground factors that drive state behaviour in this field. While there are no
states that have achieved a complete exit from the international investment
regime, there are a number that have sought to make significant changes
to their practice in order to address perceived or real gaps and imbal-
ances. However, only a minority have launched a vocal and existential
attack on the investment regime. The majority have sought to implement
changes in order tomaximize sovereignmanoeuvrability while simultane-
ously adhering to international law, mirroring the form of state behaviour
under study in this book. As the editors state, the ‘multiplication of legal
regimes, overlapping jurisdictions, and diffusion of authority’, of which
the international investment is emblematic, ‘opens up an increased room
for political manoeuvring in relation to international law’.15
This chapter examines how states are shaping their critical responses to
an international legal order. For most states, the challenge is to choose
tactics that enable the reassertion of control while permitting ongoing
participation in the international investment regime and enjoyment of its
potential economic benefits. The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2
sets out an analytical framework in order to categorize distinct strate-
gic and tactical choices made by states in reaction to the current regime.
Section 4.3 examines what tactics states as principals are using to scale
back the rights granted to foreign investors in IIAs; and Section 4.4 ana-
lyzes tactics states are using as litigantswhendefending and justifying their
actions in ITA.
4.2 Strategic and Tactical Choices
Many states share an overarching goal of reasserting sovereign control
by maximizing sovereign manoeuvrability, increasing the policy space
of states to regulate in the public interest without running afoul of IIA
14 Daniel Behn, Tarald Berge and Malcolm Langford, ‘Poor States or Poor Governance:
Explaining Outcomes in Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (forthcoming)Northwestern Jour-
nal of International Law & Business.
15 Chapter 1, this volume, p. 10.
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Figure 4.1 Mapping state tactics
obligations, and reducing potential liability in ITAs brought by aggrieved
foreign investors. However, it is important to distinguish between the
scope and intensity of this objective along a spectrum and one can iden-
tify two distinct strategies. Some states have sought a radical reshaping
of the regime in law or practice while the majority have opted to remain
but sought to reduce the breadth of their international legal obligations.
Thus, tactics employed by some states to achieve themoremodest strategy
may be somewhat weak, involving subtle and discrete acts that amount to
a tweaking of, or partial expression of discontent with, the regime. How-
ever, tactics oriented towards radical reform will be strong. The state may
take a systemic approach (e.g. seek to terminate some treaties or engage
in constant non-compliance) or make radical departures from the spirit
of the regime (e.g. drastically curtailing foreign investor protections or
harassing foreign investors with domestic criminal proceedings).We have
therefore sought to distinguish along a horitonal axis the strength of the
tactics (Figure 4.1).
Moreover, we can distinguish between two roles that states perform in
the regime: (1) the state as principal – i.e. treaty-maker and international
regime shaper; and (2) the state as litigant in ITA.16 The relevant tactics
that states have as principals include, inter alia: imposing moratoriums
on the signing of new IIAs; refraining from ratifying signed IIAs; pub-
licly critiquing the regime; adjusting negotiating strategies over new IIAs
16 Anthea Roberts also discusses the dual role as treaty parties and respondents in ‘Power
and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation: The Dual Role of States’ (2010) 104(2)
American Journal of International Law 179–205, 180.
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(including development of model IIAs and increased use of impact assess-
ments and policy coordination during negotiations); excluding ISDS from
some IIAs; calling for the renegotiation of IIAs already in force; terminat-
ing of IIAs; and withdrawing from arbitration institutions (in particular,
ICSID17).
The tactics used by states as litigants in disputes include, inter alia:
attempting to bind adjudicators to sovereignty protecting interpretations
of certain treaty provisions; commencing domestic criminal proceedings
against foreign investor claimants after a dispute arises; refusing to com-
ply with awards; engaging in delay tactics; increasing the use of procedural
motions for challenging arbitrators; requesting security for costs and other
forms of injunctive relief; and making novel challenges to the jurisdiction
of tribunals.
Figure 4.1 melds this principal/litigant and strong/weak strategic
dichotomy in order to group the relationships of states to the current
regime (i.e. that which has emerged since the early 2000s).18 States that
deploy strong tactics as both principals and litigants can be character-
ized as absolute opponents as reflecting their total opposition to the regime
(group I). States that strongly seek reform but largely play by the rules of
fair litigation can be labelled principled opponents: they wish to change the
framework but largely abide by previous commitments (group II). States
that largely support the regime but seek to obstruct proceedingswhen sub-
ject to ITA through strong-form litigation tactics can be labelled reluctant
compliers (group III). Finally, there is a diverse group of states that adopt
neither set of tactics, which we will call compliers (group IV). By compli-
ers we mean states that actively or passively evince a formal commitment
to the idea and practice of the regime. However, this group may contain
false positives (states that move easily into another group once the costs
of compliance become too high).
The functions of these tactics differ. Their activation may carry differ-
ent material or symbolic effects for the international investment regime,
with some tactics potentially precipitating both types of effects.19 Primar-
ily, tactics with material effects will aim at revising, restricting, reforming
17 International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes.
18 Modern IIAs emerged fromEurope in the years following the SecondWorldWar.However,
it was not until the 1990s that the majority of the 3000 plus IIAs were signed. We delimit
the current regime from the early 2000s for the reason that this is when ITAs (as based on
IIAs) began to be filed with increasing frequency.
19 On this general distinction, see César Rodriguez-Garavito, ‘Beyond the Courtroom: The
Impact of Judicial Activism on Socioeconomic Rights in Latin America’ (2011) 89 Texas
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or terminating the IIAs that grant arbitrators the direct legal authority to
effectively adjudicate claims. Such material effects may be systemic if the
space in which arbitrators operate in future disputes is significantly cur-
tailed or states regularly obstruct or block individual arbitral disputes to
which they are a party.
Tactics employed by states and other stakeholders may have symbolic
effects if they send a signal to arbitrators about state displeasure with the
operation of the regime, which might result in arbitrators being more
cautious or deferential in ruling against states.20 These symbolic effects
might result from state criticism of the regime or partial exit but also indi-
rectly through the use of various litigation tactics, which collectivelymight
shift arbitrator behaviour towards a more deferential mode of adjudica-
tion. Such behaviour may also indirectly influence the behaviour of other
states. As a response to reduced legitimacy of the investment regime, states
may be more cautious in their treaty-making and bolder in their litigation
tactics.
In the next two sections, we explore the emergence of different state
tactics in their roles as principals and litigators.
4.3 States as Principals
In the literature on the international investment regime, state tactics as
‘principals’ have been divided categorically into exit and voice.21 Exit
involves a break with the regime while the use of voice seeks regime
reform. These tactics can vary significantly in nature and strength. As
foreshadowed above and illustrated inmoe detail in Figure 4.2, they range
from full system exit (i.e. systemic termination of all treaties with no intent
to renegotiate) through to minor modifications to treaty texts.
Law Review 1669–98 at 1679–81; on the symbolic and communicative effect of law gen-
erally, see Thomas Meisenhelder, ‘Law as Symbolic Action: Kenneth Burke’s Sociology of
Law’ (1981) 4 Symbolic Interaction 43–57.
20 However, if these tactics by states are seen as overtly abusive or in violation of general
principles of law, arbitrators may actually become less deferential. For a theory and test
of arbitrator reflexivity, see Malcolm Langford and Daniel Behn, ‘Managing Backlash: The
Evolving Investment Treaty Arbitrator’ (forthcoming) European Journal of International
Law.
21 Roberts, note 16 above; Alvarez, note 6 above; Nancy Welsh, Andrea Kupfer Schneider
and Kathryn Rimpfel, ‘Using the Theories of Exit Voice, Loyalty, and Procedural Justice
to Reconceptualize Brazil’s Rejection of Bilateral Investment Treaties’ (2014) 45Washing-
ton Universtity Journal of Law and Policy 105–43; on the general distinction between exit
and voice, see Albert Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms,
Organizations, and States (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), 4.
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Strong
(absolute or principled opponents)
Weak
(reluctant compliers or compliers)
Exit
Systemic termination of treaties
Termination of ISDS provisions
Refraining from ratifying signed treaties
Sporadic termination of treaties
Sporadic termination of ISDS provisions
Sporadic refusal to ratify signed treaties
Voice
Withdrawal from ICSID
Attempting forced treaty renegotiation
Systemic political delegitimisation
New model treaties
Sporadic treaty renegotiation
Sporadic clarifications of treaties
Sporadic adoption of new models
Figure 4.2 Principal tactics
From the perspective of this volume, full exit is not a tactic of particu-
lar interest. In such a scenario, states would transparently relinquish their
commitment to the regime and could not be accused of seeking to reform
or undermine their existing commitments. However, while announced
exits have grabbed headlines, there is no example to date of any states con-
ducting a full exit from the international investment regime.22 The rea-
sons for this will be explored below. Moreover, a number of states have
employed a combination of partial exit and partial voice tactics simulta-
neously, although their intentions for such a combination are not always
clear. We can therefore classify tentatively three types of strong tactics by
states which have been used and are likely to impact the regime: (1) partial
exit; (2) hybrid tactics; and (3) systemic voice.
However, it is worth noting that not all states share the overarching
strategy of limiting the protections granted to foreign investors under
existing and future treaties. The tactics are not unidirectional. A few states,
such as China and Germany, have sought to expand the rights of foreign
investors under future IIAs.23 Moreover, most states continue to sign new
22 However, a few Latin American states are getting close. Both Ecuador and Bolivia have
terminated a number of their IIAs with no intent to renegotiate them; and both of these
states have denounced the ICSID Convention.
23 Kate Hadley, ‘Do China’s BITS matter? Assessing the Effect of China’s Investment
Agreements on Foreign Direct Investment Flows, Investor’s Rights, and the Rule of Law’
(2013) 45 Georgetown Journal of International Law 255–321, at 275–309; Chester Brown,
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IIAs (particularly through FTAs) although their support may be for a less
potent regime.
4.3.1 Partial Exit
The first category is partial exit and is exemplified by announced attempts
by a cluster of Latin American states to leave the regime. Yet, these stri-
dent proclamations of exit provide a certain puzzle. States such as Bolivia,
Venezuela, Ecuador and Argentina have terminated some of their BITs
and/or exited or announced an exit from the ICSID Convention (also
known as the Washington Convention);24 but they are far from execut-
ing a full exit from the international investment regime.25 It might be
thought that these states are being duplicitous – seeking to remain within
the international investment regime (in order to capture its benefits) while
weakening their own obligations. However, it seems that the partial exit
of these states might be better characterized as unintended. They gen-
uinely thought they could fully exit. Instead, they discovered that the legal
infrastructure of the regimemakes the regime sticky.26 In the Argentinean
Commentaries on Selected Model Investment Treaties (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2013), 7.
24 Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela withdrew from the ICSID Convention in 2007, 2010 and
2012, respectively. At one point, Argentina also signalled its intention to follow suit, and
the government introduced a bill in its parliament in March 2012 to this effect. Federico
Lavopa, Lucas Barreiros and Victoria Bruno, ‘How to Kill a BIT and Not Die Trying: Legal
and Political Challenges of Denouncing or Renegotiating Bilateral Investmewnt Treaties’
(2013) 17 Journal of International Economic Law 869–91, at 871.
25 Clint Peinhardt and Rachel Wellhausen, ‘Withdrawing from Investment Treaties but Pro-
tecting Investment’ (2016) 7(2) Global Policy 571–76, ‘documents the group of states that
have taken advantage of unilateral withdrawal, and demonstrate that states can recali-
brate their international legal commitments without eschewing contemporary interna-
tional investment law’. While this might be correct at the aggregate level, our updated
numbers show that a small but growing number of states might be classified as absolute
opponents to the regime.
26 One challenging issue that arises when the parties to an IIA mutually agree to terminate
the treaty arises in relation to foreign investors’ interests. To what extent are their rights
protected in such situations? This remains a largely unresolved issue in international law.
On the one hand, it can be argued that states are free to eliminate the effects of a treaty
if they are in mutual agreement. On the other hand, it can possibly be argued that states
are not free to do so if it would detrimentally affect essential rights and expectations of
third parties. Whether it could be argued that IIAs provide rights to investors that would
be protected according to this latter argument is debatable. Tania Voon, Andrew Mitchell
and James Munro, ‘Parting Ways: The Impact of Investor Rights on Mutual Termina-
tion of Investment Treaties’ (2014) 29(2) ICSID Review – Foreign Investment Law Journal
451–73.
Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108349420.005
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Universitetsbiblioteket i Oslo  (UiO), on 26 Feb 2019 at 09:10:49, subject to the Cambridge
backlash and state strategies 79
case, however, a shift in political leadership (the election of the Macri
Government in 2015) seems also to have been a major contributing
factor.
The two principal forms of exit are termination of IIAs and with-
drawal from procedural commitments to particular arbitration fora, e.g.
through denunciation of the ICSID Convention. The first wave of states
initially embraced the latter approach.27 This ‘Latin American’ strategy
was precipitated by investment-related disputes that culminated in ITAs –
mostly through the ICSID procedure.28 However, the effectiveness of this
ICSID Convention exit strategy has been questioned. The ICSID Con-
vention is procedural and not substantive in orientation.29 Frequently, an
ISDS provision in an IIA will include a number of institutional and non-
institutional options for claim initiation (of which ICSID arbitration is just
one option). Obviously, withdrawal from the ICSID Convention does not
imply withdrawal from other venues for ITA. Moreover, withdrawal from
the ICSID Convention would not prevent foreign investors from bring-
ing cases under the ISCID Additional Facility rules.30 Thus, to date, the
impact of ICSID Convention withdrawal has been more symbolic than
material.
Where there is lack of mutual agreement among states as to termina-
tion, the stickiness of the international investment regime depends on the
challenges of unilaterally terminating the individual IIA. Various lock-
in provisions extend the horizon of investment protections well into the
future. First, most treaties include ‘tacit’ renewal clauses, a feature some-
what peculiar to IIAs. These clauses usually provide for automatic renewal
of the IIA for a new fixed period (frequently for a subsequent period of
ten years). Any unilateral termination of these agreements would have
no effect on foreign investors’ rights unless the IIA includes a separate
27 Our PITAD database (note 10 above) reveals the following number of disputes filed per
state: Bolivia (fifteen), Venezuela (forty-three) and Ecuador (twenty-four). The majority
are ICSID arbitrations (62 per cent or fifty-one out of eighty-two ITAs).
28 See Malcolm Langford and Daniel Behn, ‘Managing Backlash: The Evolving Investment
Treaty Arbitrator’ (forthcoming) European Journal of International Law.
29 See Lavopa, Barreiros and Bruno, note 24 above, at 874–78.
30 An effective unilateral withdrawal from the ISDS provisions of IIAs would require termi-
nation of the IIA or renegotiation of the IIA with ISDS provisions excluded. Moreover, it
is not clear when, and sometimes even if, the denunciation of ICSID takes effect. There is
dispute in the literature over whether consent is required from parties to different bilateral
treaties (since it affects the possibility of access to dispute resolution) and whether ICSID
continues to apply to ‘survival’ clauses in treaties. See discussion in Lavopa, Barreiros and
Bruno, note 24 above, at 877–78.
Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108349420.005
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Universitetsbiblioteket i Oslo  (UiO), on 26 Feb 2019 at 09:10:49, subject to the Cambridge
80 langford, behn and fauchald
termination clause. Second, even once termination is achieved, states may
face ‘survival clauses’. Most IIAs include a ‘tail’ that provides treaty pro-
tections for foreign investors (whomade their investment prior to the ter-
mination of the treaty) for an extended period after the treaty terminates.
One study found that such provisions prolong investor protections for an
average of twelve and a half years after treaty termination in order to pro-
vide a predictable legal environment.31 The stickiness of IIAs is further
enhanced by the bilateral character of most of these treaties. Such IIAs are
frequently signed as a token of friendly relations. It is likely that a decision
to unilaterally terminate an IIA with all or particular states could be per-
ceived as unnecessarily unfriendly. Nevertheless, many states, including
those that have withdrawn from the ICSID Convention, have also uni-
laterally or through mutual consent terminated some of their IIAs. Most
IIAs have termination clauses allowing for one state party to the treaty to
unilaterally give notice of the intent to not renew a treaty for an extended
period as stipulated in the treaty. This automatic renewal is typically sub-
ject to provisions that allow for either state party to unilaterally terminate
the treaty by giving notice prior to the treaties’ expiration (often requiring
such notice one year ahead of the renewal).
An emerging tactic is to request termination of the treatywith the inten-
tion of renegotiating a new treaty with the same state party. The approach
is staggered so that it takes account of the various lock-in provisions. If
we look closer at the states that have withdrawn from ICSID, we find
that two of them have terminated or are in the process of terminating a
very significant number of their BITs; Bolivia has terminated eleven and
eleven remain in force,32 and Ecuador has terminated or decided to ter-
minate twenty-two and four will remain in force.33 Arguably, these two
31 Kathryn Gordon and Joachim Pohl, ‘Investment Treaties over Time: Treaty Practice and
Interpretation in a Changing World’, OECD Working Papers on International Investment
(Paris: OECD Publishing, 2015), at 19.
32 Bolivia has unilaterally terminated its BITs with Argentina (2014), Austria (2013), the
Belgium-Luxembourg EconomicUnion (2014), Denmark (2014), France (2013), Germany
(2013), the Netherlands (2009), Spain (2012), Sweden (2013) and the United States (US)
(2012). It has not signed any new BITs or other IIAs since 2004. UNCTAD, note 2 above,
as of 16 May 2017.
33 Ecuador has terminated its BITs with Cuba (2008), Dominican Republic (2008), El
Salvador (2008), Finland (2010), Guatemala (2008), Honduras (2008), Nicaragua (2008),
Paraguay (2008), Romania (2008) and Uruguay (2008). It has not signed any new BITs
or other IIAs with ISDS clauses since 2002. UNCTAD, note 2 above, as of 16 May
2017. Parliamentary decisions of 3 May 2017 decided that Ecuador shall denounce its
BITs with Argentina, Bolivia, Canada, Chile, China, Italy, the Netherlands, Peru, Spain,
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states might qualify as ‘absolute opponents’ to the regime. The same could
be the case for Brazil, which has signed twenty BITs of which none have
entered into force.34 Brazil published a model BIT in 2015 and signed six
new BITs the same year, none of which include ISDS. Hence, Brazil could
be classified as an absolute opponent to ISDS, but not to IIAs in general.
Venezuela has not pursued any policy of denouncing its BITs (except its
BIT with the Netherlands), and while it seems to have wished to pursue a
strategy of material exit, the result has been a tactic of voice, an expression
of displeasure.35
4.3.2 Hybrid Tactics
A second group of states have adopted an approach that clearly com-
bines different exit and voice tactics, which may be effective in balanc-
ing enhanced sovereignty with the need to maintain a reputation for a
positive investment climate. Such initiatives could include termination of
BITs combined with the aim of renegotiating ISDS provisions or substan-
tive clauses that are regarded as particularly controversial. Whether other
states are always likely to be more sympathetic to such approaches than
to unilateral termination is hard to say. States belonging to the group of
compliers could in some cases prefer that other states remain within the
regime, and accept the renegotiation of the IIA. However, other compli-
ers may oppose renegotiation because it could set a precedent and lead to
further calls for systemic reform.
Based on a review of states that have terminated a significant number
of their treaties, either unilaterally or by mutual consent, we may possi-
bly consider the Czech Republic, India, Indonesia, Italy and South Africa
in this category.36 In addition, it is important to consider a wider group of
Switzerland, the US and Venezuela. See ‘La Asamblea Denuncia 12 Tratados Bilaterales
de Inversión’, El Telégrafo, 3 May 2017. This decision follows decisions by the Constitu-
tional Court regarding the constitutionality of ISDS clauses in BITs, see Alexander Avtgis,
‘Rethinking Article 422: A Retrospective on Ecuador’s 2008 Constitutional ISDS Recali-
bration’ (2016) 2(2) Indiana Journal of Constitutional Design, 1–21, at 8–11.
34 The new BITs were signed with Angola, Chile, Colombia, Malawi, Mexico and Mozam-
bique. UNCTAD, note 2 above, as of 16 May 2017. An explanation could be that these
BITs were signed by Brazil as an emerging capital exporter. See also Welsh et al., note 21
above; Yoram Haftel and Alexander Thompson, ‘Delayed Ratification: The Domestic Fate
of Bilateral Investment Treaties’ (2013) 67 International Organization 355–87.
35 Venezuela terminated its BIT with the Netherlands in 2008. Twenty-seven BITs remain in
force. UNCTAD, note 2 above, as of 16 May 2017.
36 The Czech Republic has by mutual consent terminated its BITs with Denmark
(2009), Estonia (2011), Ireland (2011), Italy (2009), Malta (2010), Slovakia (2004) and
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states that have engaged in systematic renegotiation of their IIAs. Based on
theoretical considerations and anecdotal evidence, Haftel and Thompson
hypothesize that ‘states renegotiate when they acquire new information
about the legal and political consequences of their treaty commitments,
and that this learning occurs especially when states are involved in invest-
ment arbitration’.37 Thus, based on their findings, the following can be
regarded as significant renegotiators, as each has renegotiated ten or more
BITs: Romania, the Czech Republic, Germany, China, Egypt, Bulgaria,
Morocco, Slovakia and Finland. The only overlap with our preliminary
list is the Czech Republic.38 However, given that there are many alterna-
tive reasonswhy statesmay choose to renegotiate, we should exclude states
that only or essentially have renegotiated old BITs that are ripe for rene-
gotiation due to their limited investment protections (Bulgaria,39 Egypt,40
Slovenia (2009) – seventy-seven BITs remain in force. India has unilaterally terminated
its BITs with Argentina (2013), Australia (2017), Austria (2017), Hungary (2017), Indone-
sia (2016), Italy (2017), theNetherlands (2016) andOman (2017) – sixty-six BITs remain in
force. Indonesia has unilaterally (except for Argentina) terminated its BITs with Argentina
(2016), Bulgaria (2015), Cambodia (2016), China (2015), Egypt (2014), France (2015),
Hungary (2016), India (2016), Italy (2015), Lao PDR (2015), Malaysia (2015), the Nether-
lands (2015), Norway (2004), Pakistan (2016), Romania (2016), Singapore (2016), Slovakia
(2015), Spain (2016), Switzerland (2016), Turkey (2016) and Viet Nam (2016) – twenty-
seven BITs remain in force. Italy has terminated its BITs with Bulgaria (2010, by consent),
Croatia (2013), Czech Republic (2009, by consent), Estonia (2009, by consent), Hungary
(2008, by consent), India (2017), Indonesia (2015), Latvia (2009, by consent), Poland (2013,
by consent), Romania (2010, by consent), Slovakia (2012, by consent), Slovenia (2009, by
consent), Uganda (2014) and Ukraine (2012, by consent) – seventy-six BITs remain in
force. Italy also withdrew from the Energy Charter Treaty (2014, effective 2016). South
Africa has unilaterally terminated its BITs with Austria (2014), the Belgium-Luxembourg
Economic Union (2013), Denmark (2014), France (2014), Germany (2014), the Nether-
lands (2014), Spain (2013), Switzerland (2014) and the UK (2014) – fourteen BITs remain
in force. Moreover, a significant number of treaties that these states have signed have not
entered into force (Czech Republic, four; India, ten; Italy, twelve; South Africa, twenty-six),
UNCTAD, note 2 above, as of 16May 2017. See also Haftel and Thompson, note 31 above.
37 Yoram Haftel and Alexander Thompson, ‘When Do States Renegotiate Investment Agree-
ments? The Impact of Arbitration’ (forthcoming) The Review of International Organiza-
tions 1–24, at 20 (pre-published version).
38 Ibid., at 10.
39 According to our findings based on BITs that have been replaced by newer version BITs
(a narrower definition of renegotiation than that of Haftel and Thompson, ibid.), we find
that Bulgaria has only renegotiated two BITs which first were signed during the period of
1984–88 and renegotiated versions were signed in 1997–99. UNCTAD supra note 2 as of
16 May 2017.
40 Egypt’s thirteen renegotiated BITs were first signed during period of 1966–88 and renego-
tiated versions were signed between 1994 and 2010. UNCTAD, note 2 above, as of 16 May
2017.
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Germany41 andMorocco,42 as well as China43 and Finland44). This means
that we only add Romania and Slovakia to our list of states following a
hybrid approach.45 What is common to all states in this hybrid category
is that they have also been subject to ITA.46 This fits with the aggrega-
tive pattern of renegotiation tactics. According to Haftel and Thompson,
there is only a 15 per cent likelihood of renegotiation amongst states who
have never experienced ITA; a figure that rises to 25 per cent for states that
have experienced three or more disputes.47
This hybrid approach is likely to become frequently adopted amongst
those states who believe that IIAs are one-sided agreements that protect
investors at the expense of a state’s legitimate policy goals and its ability
to regulate in the public interest. Prominent examples include Indonesia’s
notification that it intends to terminate all of its existing BITs with the
goal of renegotiating new BITs with many (if not all) of its previous treaty
41 Germany’s eighteen renegotiated BITs were first signed during the period of 1959–83 and
renegotiated versions were signed between1996 and 2010. UNCTAD, note 2 above, as of
May 2017.
42 Morocco’s twelve renegotiated BITs were first signed during the period of 1961–89 and
renegotiated versions were signed in the period of 1996–2007. The status of the two
remaining BITs is unclear as neither the original versions (signed in 1997 and 2001) nor
the renegotiated versions (signed in 2001 and 2006) have entered into force. UNCTAD,
note 2 above, as of 16 May 2017.
43 We find a somewhat mixed picture for China concerning renegotiation: 13 of 15 renegoti-
ated BITswere signed during the period of 1984–92, a period duringwhichChina included
very limited ISDS clauses in its BITs. However, we do not have access to the treaty texts of
all these treaties. The remaining two treaties were first signed with African states in 1997.
UNCTAD, note 2 above, as of 16 May 2017.
44 We find a somewhat mixed picture for Finland concerning renegotiation: only four of nine
renegotiated BITswere signed during the period of 1980–90 (three ofwhich did not include
ISDS clauses) and new versions were signed in the period of 1996–2004. The remaining
five BITswere first signed between 1992–96 and renegotiated versionswere signed between
2004 and 2008, UNCTAD, note 2 above, as of 16 May 2017.
45 We find a mixed picture for Romania; seven out of twelve renegotiated BITs originated in
the period of 1976–82 and renegotiated versions of these were signed between 1994 and
1996. Two of the remaining BITs also seem to have been renegotiated at least partly due
to weak protection of investors’ rights (BITs with Korea and Turkey). The remaining three
seem to have been renegotiated for other reasons (BITs with Canada, Greece and Kaza-
khstan). All the four renegotiated treaties of Slovakia were originally signed between1990
and 2000 and renegotiated versions were signed between 2002 and 2010. UNCTAD, note 2
above, as of 16 May 2017.
46 Our PITAD database (note 10 above) reveals the following number of disputes filed per
state: Czech Republic (35), India (21), Indonesia (8), Italy (8), Romania (13), Slovakia (14)
and South Africa (1). Only a minority of these disputes are ICSID arbitrations (32 per cent
or thirty-two out of one hundred disputes).
47 Haftel and Thompson, note 37 above, at 17.
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partners,48 the Czech Republic which has actively terminated and renego-
tiated a high number of treaties out of public policy and other concerns,49
and South Africa whose new policy towards IIAs was triggered by the
case of Foresti v. South Africa, which challenged its affirmative action
legislation.50 In 2007, South Africa placed a moratorium on the negoti-
ation of any new IIAs and conducted a full and comprehensive review of
its IIA policy. Following the conclusion of the review in 2010, SouthAfrica
announced that it would refrain from entering into BITs unless there were
compelling reasons for such a course of action and terminate existing BITs
and offer renegotiation on the basis of a new model agreement.51
A materially different but symbolically similar strategy was pursued
by Australia. The Gillard government announced in 2011 that no future
IIA with Australia would include ISDS provisions.52 Subsequently, ITA
provisions in IIAs have generally had a limited scope.53 However, after a
change of government, Australia did sign and ratify an FTA with Korea
that included strong ISDS provisions in 2014. It is therefore not clear that
Australia could be added to our list of states with hybrid tactics.
4.3.3 Systemic Voice
A final approach is a more indirect or step-by-step move towards ‘bal-
anced’ IIAs. As noted above, there is a recent emergence of initiatives to
renegotiate IIAs. These tactics generally form part of a hybrid strategy
and thus it is rare to find states outside this category pursuing this goal.
Moreover, clear instances of systemic political delegitimization of IIAs
48 Leon Trakman and Kunal Sharma, ‘Indonesia’s Termination of the Nethelrands-Indonesia
BIT: Broader Implications in the Asia-Pacific’ (Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 1 September
2014).
49 Tomáš Fecák, ‘Czech Experience with Bilateral Investment Treaties: Somewhat Bitter Taste
of Investment Protection’ (2011) 2 Czech Yearbook of Public & Private International Law
233–67.
50 Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli & Others v. The Republic of South Africa, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/07/01, discontinued 4 August 2010.
51 The Cabinet based their decision on the DTI, Bilateral Investment Treaty Policy Framework
Review, Pretoria, South Africa, June 2009.
52 JürgenKurtz, ‘Australia’s Rejection of Investor–StateArbitration: Causation,Omission and
Implication’ (2012) 27(1) ICSID Review 65–86.
53 See the investment chapter in the Australia – China Free Trade Agreement (2015), the
Agreement between Australia and Japan for an Economic Partnership (2014), theMalaysia –
Australia Free Trade Agreement (2012) and the Protocol on Investment to the New Zealand –
Australia Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (2011). UNCTAD, note 2 above, as
of 16 May 2017.
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are hard to identify beyond states’ attempts at termination of the ICSID
Convention.
However, the adoption of a ‘new generation’ of model treaties over
the past ten years is a signal from some key states that IIAs are in need
of reform. These states form a category that seeks to use systemic voice
tactics.54 In the early 2000s, the US sought to develop a third-generation
model BIT that reflected the fact that it had been the subject of a number
of suits by Canadian corporations under the NAFTA. The 2004 model US
BIT scaled back a number of foreign investor protections in favour of pro-
tecting the sovereign prerogatives of the state hosting the foreign invest-
ment. While the 2004 model and more recent 2012 model include robust
ISDS provisions, these provisions have been more thoroughly refined and
many of the substantive provisions have been revised (with the level of for-
eign investor protection reduced). Overall, the models seek to recalibrate
the balance between the rights accorded investors and a nation’s right to
regulate in the public interest.55
It has been contended that the new restrictive USmodel treaty has been
as influential as the earlier expansive version:
If the United States led the charge in favour of investor protections, it now
appears to be leading the drive in the opposite direction. The 2004 U.S.
Model BIT is at least twice as long as it once was – and as every lawyer
knows, the length of a treaty is often inversely related to the rights that it
accords. The 2004 U.S. Model BIT has now shrunk, sometimes dramati-
cally, virtually every right originally accorded to foreign investors while at
the same time increasing, sometimes vastly, the discretion accorded host
states.56
The changes were noticed and are reflected in treaties negotiated by states
as diverse as Canada, Mexico, India and China.57 The recently concluded
Comprehensive Economic andTradeAgreement betweenCanada and the
EU (CETA, 2014) is particularly important in this regard, as it signals the
future direction of the EU and consequently of its Member States with
regard to IIAs. The CETA follows the approach of the US and Canada
in most respects. Gordon and Pohl find that while significant differ-
ences remain, there is a convergence towards the US and Canadian model
54 See Tarald Laudal Berge and Øyvind Stiansen, ‘Negotiating BITs with Models: The Power
of Expertise’ (2016) PluriCourts Research Paper No. 16–13.
55 Jose Alvarez, ‘Contemporary International Law: An “Empire of Law” or the “Law of
Empire”’ (2009) 24(5) American University International Law Review 811–42 at 834.
56 Alvarez, note 6 above, at 235. 57 Ibid., at 237.
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treaties.58 We know of fifty-three states that have drafted model treaties,
of which forty-eight have made them publicly available potentially with a
view to influencing the drafting policy of other states. The most active
producer of such models has been the US which published its fifth
model in 2012. Thereafter follow Germany, Guatemala and Turkey which
have drafted three editions, as well as Colombia, India, the Netherlands,
Norway and the UK which have drafted second editions. Moreover, some
states of particular interest have joined in recent years, including Brazil
(2015), the Czech Republic (2016) and Slovakia (2016).59
4.3.4 Concluding Remarks
The above discussion reveals that a number of states have made some sig-
nificant changes in their approach to IIAswhich intentionally or otherwise
have sought to weaken their commitments as principals. While the num-
ber is small andmay seemgeographically limited, there are signs thatmore
and more states are revising their approach to IIAs. However, the reforms
vary in their intention, strength and significance. So far, there are only two
states (Ecuador and Bolivia) that are seeking a full and clean exit from the
international investment regime. Other states have displayed a willingness
to rebuild the ship while it sails at sea: some strengthening foreign investor
rights, including ISDS (e.g. China and Germany), while the majority of
others are weakening foreign investor rights while still remaining part of
the regime. These states have sought to renegotiate treaties directly or
exclude or limit ISDS clauses in treaties (e.g. Indonesia, India, Poland,
Romania, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Morocco, Italy, Bulgaria, Egypt,
and South Africa) or changed the terms of their model treaties or their
future negotiating strategy (e.g. the US, the EU, Canada, Norway, Rus-
sia and Australia). Interestingly, the latter may exert the strongest mate-
rial and symbolic effects on the overall international investment regime,
although it is dependent on how arbitrators respond to the new provisions
and signals.
4.4 States as Litigants in Investment Treaty Arbitration
The role of the state as a litigant in international legal disputes is quite dif-
ferent from its role as principal. It is different because when a state is a
58 Gordon and Pohl, note 31 above, at 37–38.
59 UNCTAD, note 2 above, as of 16 May 2017. We have included the Norwegian model
treaties even if none of the two versions have been formally adopted. The most recent ver-
sion of the Turkish model (2016) is not (yet) publicly available.
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litigant in an international dispute, much of its authority as a sovereign is
limited. Once a state has consented to a treaty that includes ISDS, control
is largely deferred to a third-party adjudicator. This is a reversal of the clas-
sical model of international arbitration in which jurisdiction for a dispute
was negotiated on a case-by-case basis. In the case of ISDS, the state has a
reduced ability to ex post modify the terms upon which it had previously
agreed to be bound. Once a dispute has been initiated, the state is limited
in the types of tactics it can employ to influence the proceedings. We will
therefore examine the particular tactics that states do (and can) wield in
defending against private parties’ investment treaty claims.
States are always on the respondent side of the dispute in ITA. With
counter-claims being infrequently invoked, state respondents in ITA are
primarily concerned with avoiding liability that could result in large dam-
age awards. In the early days of ITA claims, the infrequency of disputes
meant that states likely responded and participated in defending invest-
ment treaty claims with few specific tactics in mind. However, as the
regime has grown, states have developed a variety of tactics in defend-
ing claims; especially those states that have had to defend against multiple
claims (e.g. Argentina and Venezuela).
While there is little evidence that states are taking extreme mea-
sures such as refusing to participate in arbitral proceedings60 or directly
influencing arbitrators,61 there is evidence that states are employing
increasingly aggressive tactics in defending ITA claims. These include a
number of procedural and legal tactics, such as: utilizing the domestic
criminal system of the respondent state; claimant and witness intimida-
tion; reinterpreting treaties after a dispute is filed; refusing or delaying
enforcement of awards (including excessive use of the ICSID annulment
60 Some of the early (mid-twentieth-century) investment arbitrations involving contract-
based claims were adjudicated without participation of the respondent state (see e.g. the
Libyan hydrocarbon concession arbitrations of the 1970s).However, there is a recent exam-
ple, whereby the Russian Federation is refusing to participate in ITA proceedings brought
by Ukrainian investors in Crimea under the Russia-Ukraine BIT. See Aeroport Belbek LLC
and Mr. Igor Valerievich Kolomoisky v. The Russian Federation, PCA Case No. 2014–30,
pending;PJSCCBPrivatBank and Finance Company Finilon LLC v. The Russian Federation,
PCA Case No. 2015–21, pending; Everest Estate LLC and others v. The Russian Federation,
PCA Case No. 2015–36, pending.
61 There is an infamous (and fairly unique) example where Indonesian officials abducted an
arbitrator upon arrival at Schiphol airport in the Netherlands in order to prevent him from
attending hearings in the Hague to which he was a member of the tribunal. See ‘Him-
purna v. Indonesia’ (2000) 15Mealey’s Int’l Arb. Rep. (February); see also Stephen Schwebel,
‘Injunction of Arbitral Proceedings and Truncation of the Tribunal’ (2003) 18(4) Int’l Arb.
Rep. 33.
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process); using novel jurisdictional challenges; and employing various tac-
tics for delaying proceedings or making them excessively costly (such as
refusing claim consolidation, claim bifurcation, challenging arbitrators
and partial, delayed or no compliance with procedural and substantive
orders).
But states are not alone. The high-stakes and serious nature of many
ITA claims can lead to the employment of aggressive litigation tactics on
both sides. In this chapter, however, we focus exclusively on shifting trends
in litigation tactics employed by respondent states. In some cases, these
essentially mirror tactics equally available to foreign investor claimants.
Yet, the state’s sovereign authority may be used to obstruct or unbalance
arbitral proceedings initiated by private parties. We will therefore draw
on particular examples where the tactics employed by respondent states
in ITA can be only pursued by a state (i.e. where the state uses both its
sovereign status and/or the apparatus of the state itself to gain a tactical
advantage in a proceeding against a private litigant).
Extensive resort to ‘strong’ litigation tactics by (ab)using the state’s
sovereign position would place states as either ‘absolute opponents’ of or
‘reluctant compliers’ to the international investment regime. However, an
excessive use of other obstructionist tactics may also, in some circum-
stances, place a state in these categories. (Ab)use of such tactics may easily
breach the ‘equality of arms’ principle.We are particularly concerned with
litigation tactics that can be seen to deviate from this principle. Waelde
states the issue as:
‘Equality of arms’ is a foundation principle of investment arbitration pro-
cedure. A government sued on the basis of an investment treaty, signed to
encourage foreign and private investment by promising effective protec-
tion, should prosecute its case vigorously but within the framework of the
principles of ‘good faith’ arbitration, the applicable arbitration rules, and
with respect to ‘equality of arms’.62
As the ITA caseload grows, we are increasingly able to identify litigation
trendswhere sovereign deference to the ‘equality of arms’ principle is wan-
ing.We will look at three recent trends that represent strong litigation tac-
tics in which the state (perhaps) most clearly abuses its role as sovereign:
(1) criminal proceedings during disputes; (2) (ab)using the dual role of
states in ITA; and (3) refusing to enforce or satisfy arbitral awards.
62 ThomasWaelde, ‘“Equality of Arms” in Investment Arbitration: Procedural Challenges’, in
Katia Yannaca-Small (ed.)Arbitration Under International Investment Agreements: A Guide
to the Key Issues (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 167.
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4.4.1 Criminal Proceedings during Disputes
The most significant and recent tactical shift in the way that respondent
states are defending ITA claims is in the area of domestic judicial proceed-
ings. It is of course reasonable and not unusual for respondent states to use
their judiciary to enforce domestic law against foreign investors operating
within their borders.What is relatively new is a tactic whereby the domes-
tic judicialmachinery is activated as a response to an ITA claim. This tactic
is arguably (ab)used for three purposes: (1) to obstruct, delay or interfere
with the proceedings of the ITA; (2) to (ab)use the domestic legal system
to obtain evidence and information that can be used against the claimant
in the arbitration proceedings; and (3) to intimidate, scare or coerce the
claimant and its witnesses after the ITA is initiated. All three of these tac-
tics are within the purview of the respondent host state to initiate, but can
be seen as troubling where they have disguised objectives or can be seen
as bad faith manoeuvres in order to gain tactical advantage in a pending
arbitration.
To highlight how states have used this tactic in recent cases, a num-
ber of pertinent examples are provided. In Border Timbers v. Zimbabwe
and Von Pezold v. Zimbabwe,63 a group of Dutch and Swiss farm own-
ers in Zimbabwe claimed that their farms were unlawfully expropriated.
During the course of the proceedings, the claimants received a letter
from Zimbabwe’s attorney general demanding that they disclose certain
documents in connection with the arbitration; and that if they refused,
Zimbabwe would institute domestic criminal proceedings.64 In a proce-
dural order dated 13 June 2012, the president of the tribunal directed
Zimbabwe to cease pursuit of the demands.65 A year later the claimants
requested urgent injunctive relief in relation to a number of threatening
altercations on the claimant’s farm towhich the local police refused to pro-
vide assistance. In a procedural order refusing to grant the claimant’s relief,
the tribunal noted ‘that the Claimants continue to “feel intimidated” by the
63 Border Timbers Limited, Timber Products International (Private) Limited and Hangani
Development Co. (Private) Limited v. Republic of Zimbabwe (Border Timbers), ICSID Case
No. ARB/10/25, Award, 28 July 2015; Bernhard von Pezold and Others v. Republic of Zim-
babwe (Von Pezold), ICSID Case No. ARB/10/15, Award, 28 July 2015.
64 Border Timbers, Directions Concerning Claimants’ Application for Provisional Measures
of 12 June 2012, 13 June 2012; Von Pezold, Directions Concerning Claimants’ Application
for Provisional Measures of 12 June 2012, 13 June 2012.
65 Border Timbers, Directions Concerning Claimants’ Application for Provisional Measures,
12 June 2012; Von Pezold, Directions Concerning Claimants’ Application for Provisional
Measures, 12 June 2012.
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threats made against their staff and that this intimidation is “heightened
by the fact that the Police will not act”’.66
In Quiborax v. Bolivia,67 the claimant brought a claim for compensa-
tion against Bolivia for unilaterally revoking several mining concessions.
Almost three years into the arbitration, Bolivia initiated criminal pro-
ceedings against the main shareholder of Quiborax for allegedly forg-
ing documents.68 The effect was to limit the claimant’s ability to access
important documents relevant to the arbitration (they were seized by the
state in relation to the domestic criminal proceedings); and the investors
claimed that ‘the criminal proceedings are aggravating the dispute because
they put intolerable pressure on them to abandon their claim and are
thus aimed at avoiding the resolution of the dispute’.69 Interestingly, there
is evidence that the initiation of the criminal proceedings was designed
as part of a larger defence strategy Bolivia developed specifically for this
arbitration.70
The tribunal ultimately ordered Bolivia to suspend all pending crim-
inal proceedings against the claimants and their witnesses pending the
outcome of the arbitration.71 Given the close connection of these crim-
inal proceedings with the arbitration, the tribunal was concerned that
the respondent state’s domestic actions could ‘jeopardize the procedu-
ral integrity of this arbitration’.72 The claimant alleged that these criminal
proceedings also served to reduce the willingness of witnesses to partici-
pate in the arbitration for fear of reprisals.73
In Caratube v. Kazakhstan (Caratube II),74 the claimants initiated
new proceedings relating to a previous award, Caratube v. Kazakhstan
66 Border Timbers, Procedural Order No. 4, 16 March 2013; Von Pezold, Procedural Order
No. 4, 16 March 2013.
67 Quiborax S.A. and Non-Metallic Minerals S.A. v. Plurinational State of Bolivia (Quiborax),
ICSID Case No. ARB/06/2, Award, 16 September 2015.
68 Luke Peterson, ‘Arbitrators order that (Bolivian) criminal proceedings be suspended’
(Investment Arbitration Reporter, 9 April 2010).
69 Quiborax, Decision on Provisional Measures 1 February 2010, para. III.132.
70 Ibid., para. III.122. ‘[T]hat it cannot fail to note that these [criminal proceeding] actions
were taken after an inter-ministerial committee specifically recommended in the 2004
Memo that Bolivia should try to find flaws in Claimants’ mining concessions as a defense
strategy for the ICSID arbitration. Seen jointly with the 2004 Memo, the corporate audit
and the criminal proceedings appear to be part of a defense strategy adopted by Bolivia
with respect to the ICSID arbitration’.
71 Ibid., para. V.2. 72 Ibid., para. V.1. 73 Peterson supra note 68.
74 Caratube International Oil Company LLP and Devincci Salah Hourani v. Republic of Kaza-
khstan (Caratube II), ICSID Case No. ARB/13/13, pending.
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(Caratube I),75 which concerned the unilateral termination of a hydro-
carbon concession. In what appears to be an increasingly personal and
highly charged dispute, the claimants sought injunctive relief in order
to protect Devincci Hourani (one of the primary claimants in the case),
his relatives and associates from investigations and harassment relating to
their alleged involvement in a 2004 murder in Lebanon. According to the
request, Kazakhstan had enjoined as a partie civile in criminal proceedings
against Hourani in Lebanon for an alleged murder.76 While the tribunal
denied the claimants’ request for provisional measures, it ‘found that the
Claimants have shown a certain need for protection in this Arbitration’
and that the request was not ‘unreasonable under the circumstances’.77
In Hydro v. Albania,78 a group of Italian investors and their companies
brought a claim alleging that theAlbanian authorities had failed to honour
prior commitments in relation to their electricity generation enterprises
in Albania. After the arbitration was initiated, Albania sought to have two
of the claimants (Francesco Becchetti and Mauro De Renzis) extradited
from theUK on allegations ofmoney laundering and fraud. The claimants
sought interim relief from the tribunal, requesting that the tribunal order
Albania to desist from seeking the extradition of these two individuals
from theUK. In its decision on provisionalmeasures, the tribunal ordered
Albania to cease the criminal and extradition proceedings pending the
outcome of the arbitration.79
In Al Warraq v. Indonesia,80 a Saudi banker brought a claim that the
nationalization of a bank to which he was a shareholder amounted to
an unlawful expropriation. Indonesia defended the nationalization as an
appropriate response to a foundering institution, and argued that the
claimant was actually responsible for why the bank needed to be bailed
out in the first place. In a domestic criminal proceeding that pre-dated the
initiation of the arbitration, an Indonesian court found Al Warraq guilty
in absentia of numerous financial crimes relating to his involvement in
75 Caratube International Oil Company LLP v. Republic of Kazakhstan (Caratube I), ICSID
Case No. ARB/08/12, Award, 5 June 2012.
76 Caratube II, Decision on the Claimants’ Request for Provisional Measures, 4 December
2014, para. 135.
77 Ibid., para. 155.
78 Hydro S.r.l. and others v. Republic of Albania (Hydro), ICSID Case No. ARB/15/28,
pending.
79 Hydro, Order on Provisional Measures, 3 March 2016.
80 Hesham T. M. Al Warraq v. Republic of Indonesia (Al Warraq), UNCITRAL, Award,
15 December 2014.
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Bank Century.81 After the initiation of the arbitration, Al Warraq claimed
that Indonesia attempted to derail the arbitration by freezing his assets and
obtaining an Interpol Red Notice against him.82
Churchill v. Indonesia,83 concerns a claim that Indonesia had uni-
laterally, and without cause, terminated mining licences in East Kali-
mantan. After the claim was brought, Indonesia initiated criminal pro-
ceedings against the claimants alleging that the mining licences were
procured through forged documents.84 The claimants contend that these
criminal proceedings were initiated by Indonesia to ‘“cause maximum
surprise and disruption”, and was a “tactical move” directly connected
to the arbitration’.85 In carrying out their criminal prosecution against
the claimants domestically, Indonesia raided the offices of the claimants
and confiscated numerous documents and computer hard drives that (as
claimants allege) could be used as evidence against them in the pend-
ing ITA.86 While it is possible that the raid and the forgery proceedings
were not being pursued in order to gain tactical advantage in the arbitra-
tion, there may be an good argument that Indonesia is using its sovereign
authority in contravention of the ‘equality of arms’ principle or that its
level of obstructionism places its actions in a more questionable category.
In a decision dated 15 February 2017, a tribunal in the case of Italba v.
Uruguay87 refused to enjoin Uruguay from pursuing a criminal investiga-
tion against two of the claimant’s witnesses in the case.88 Uruguay initiated
the investigation on the basis that certain documents submitted to the tri-
bunal by these witnesses were not authentic. Claimants in the case alleged
that Uruguay was abusing its position as a sovereign in the case for the
sole purpose of frustrating the arbitral proceedings.
The final example is slightly different from the previous. It deals with
threats related to the potential initiation of an investment treaty claim. In
81 Luke Peterson, ‘In Al Warraq v. Indonesia award, arbitrators devote bulk of their analysis
to assessing investor’s treatment in light of UN human rights treaty norms’ (Investment
Arbitration Reporter, 19 December 2014).
82 Ibid.
83 Churchill Mining and Planet Mining Pty Ltd, formerly ARB/12/40 v. Republic of Indonesia
(Churchill), ICSID Case No. ARB/12/40 and 12/14, Award 6 December 2016.
84 Jarrod Hepburn, ‘Arbitrators Again Decline to Order Indonesia to Desist with Criminal
Investigation into Alleged Forgery of Mining License in Churchill & Planet Mining Case’
(Investment Arbitration Reporter, 30 December 2014).
85 Ibid. 86 Ibid.
87 Italba Corporation v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/16/9, pending.
88 Italba, Decision onClaimant’s Application for ProvisionalMeasures and Temporary Relief,
15 February 2017.
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Bozbey v. Turkmenistan,89 a Turkish businessman brought a claim relat-
ing to investments made in the agricultural sector in the 1990s. Bozbey
alleged that ‘he was caught up in awave of anti-Turkish sentiment in Turk-
menistan, culminating in his imprisonment and mistreatment after he
refused to comply with a request for a bribe issued by a local tax official’.90
After eighteen months in prison, he returned to Turkey and initiated a
claim with the United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC). In
that claim, he alleged that hewas torturedwhile in prison andmost impor-
tantly, he claimed that while in prison, officials ‘wanted him to sign legal
documents . . . to undertake that he would not make any complaints and
apply to any international arbitration institution regarding his investments
in the country’.91 The UNHRC concluded that his conditions of deten-
tion constituted ‘a violation of his right to be treated with humanity and
with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person under article
10, paragraph 1, of the Covenant’.92 While Bozbey did ultimately bring an
investment treaty claim, he had to abandon it before its conclusion because
he could not meet the tribunal’s request for an advance on costs.
As these cases demonstrate, it may be difficult to trace whether and
how states use criminal proceedings in the context of ITAs. Moreover,
we are frequently faced with situations where it is impossible or very
difficult to determine who is at fault – the foreign investor, the state or
both. The cases we have identified indicate varying types of domestic pro-
ceedings that states have brought against claimants after the initiation of
the claim as well as the general reluctance of tribunals to order injunctive
relief against such domestic proceedings. Tactically speaking, it appears
that respondent states have a general degree of latitude in pursuing domes-
tic criminal proceedings and that these proceedings may be effective in
gaining an advantage over claimants. We may fear that as a consequence
of such proceedings, states that suffer from corruption or lag behind in
their implementation of ‘rule of law’ standards could be more successful
than other states in ISDS. It is therefore essential that tribunals findways to
deal with such cases that do not place an excessive burden of proof on the
claimant.
89 Farouk Bozbey v. Turkmenistan, UNCITRAL, discontinued 16 August 2013.
90 Jarrod Hepburn and Luke Peterson, ‘After Claims of Human Rights Violation Are Borne
Out, Businessman Pursues Ad-Hoc Investment Treaty Arbitration against Turkmenistan’
(Investment Arbitration Reporter, 3 April 2013).
91 Omar Faruk Bozbey v. Turkmenistan, Communication No. 1530/2006, UN Doc. CCPR/C/
100/D/1530/2006 (2010), para. 5.6.
92 Ibid., para. 7.3.
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4.4.2 (Ab)using the Dual Role of States
The second category of litigation tactics pursued with increasing fre-
quency by respondent states relate to a state’s dual role as both party to
the dispute with a foreign investor and party to the treaty upon which the
dispute is based. This dynamic can create a scenario where the respon-
dent state attempts to modify the provisions of a treaty in order to gain
advantage in a dispute to which it is a party. Timing is crucial. As a party
to a treaty, a state can always request the renegotiation (or interpretation
of particular provisions) of the treaty with a treaty partner or partners. In
a variety of ways, these new or subsequent treaties or agreements will bind
adjudicators in future disputes.93 Renegotiation or modification becomes
problematic when conducted after a particular dispute has been initiated.
Below we provide a few examples where respondent states have sought
the assistance of the investor home state for the purpose of weakening the
investor’s position in the arbitration.
In Sanum v. Lao PDR,94 an investor fromMacau brought a claim based
on the China-Lao BIT. At issue in the case was whether the BIT was
intended to include protections for investors from Macau (the location
of the foreign investor claimant). In its award on jurisdiction, the tribunal
held that the BIT does cover the investor fromMacau and that the tribunal
does have jurisdiction over the claim. Despite agreement to settle the case
inmid 2014,95 the respondent state continued to pursue set-aside proceed-
ings against the award on jurisdiction in Singapore (the seat of the arbi-
tration); and in January 2015, the Singapore High Court issued a decision
setting aside the jurisdictional award;96 but was ultimately overturned on
Appeal.97 Nonetheless, the respondent state sought to set aside the award
93 The classic example is the interpretive statement issued by the Free Trade Commission
(FTC) under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). After arbitrations
brought under NAFTA Chapter 11 where treaty parties were dissatisfied with interpreta-
tions of the FET standard in the treaty, the FTC (comprising the US, Canada and Mexico)
issued a binding interpretive statement restricting the interpretation of the FET standard to
the customary international law minimum standard of treatment. This statement has had
the effect of constituting a subsequent agreement under international law and has bound
future NAFTA tribunals.
94 Sanum Investments Limited v. Lao People’s Democratic Republic, UNCITRAL, PCA Case
No. 2013–13, Award on Jurisdiction, 13 December 2013.
95 Sanum Investments Limited v. Lao People’s Democratic Republic, UNCITRAL, PCA Case
No. 2013–13, Settlement Award, 15 June 2014.
96 Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic v. Sanum Investments Ltd. [2015]
SGHC 15, 20 January 2015.
97 Sanum Investments Ltd. v. Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic [2016]
SGCA 57, 29 September 2016.
Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108349420.005
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Universitetsbiblioteket i Oslo  (UiO), on 26 Feb 2019 at 09:10:49, subject to the Cambridge
backlash and state strategies 95
on the basis of two letters from the Chinese government (which were a
response to a request from Lao) stating that the China-Lao PDR BIT does
not apply toMacau.What is striking, and troubling, in this case is that the
respondent state used its position as a treaty party to alter the outcome of
the dispute by changing the meaning of a treaty after a dispute (to which
it was a party) had already been decided by an international tribunal.
In Ecuador v. US,98 one of very few state to state disputes based on a BIT,
Ecuador argued that US refusal to issue an interpretive note or amend-
ment to the US-Ecuador BIT on the scope of the ‘access to justice’ pro-
vision in that treaty was unlawful. This dispute arose out of an earlier
investment treaty claim,Chevron v. Ecuador (Chevron I),99 where Ecuador
was dissatisfied with the tribunal’s interpretation of the ‘access to justice’
provision. Ecuador brought the case with the aim of binding tribunals,
including the tribunal in the ongoing dispute of Chevron v. Ecuador
(Chevron II).100 While the state-to-state dispute was dismissed by the tri-
bunal for lack of jurisdiction, if it had been successful it would have bound
a tribunal to a restrictive interpretation of a treaty provision that would
favour Ecuador in an ongoing case.
These cases indicate that states may find difficulty in making unilateral
modification to its commitments under IIAs after a dispute has arisen.
However, the first case referenced above does provide anecdotal evidence
that some post-dispute interpretations of IIAs may be possible. Generally
speaking though, rules of international law, according to which disputes
shall be determined on the basis of the law applicable at the time of the
event that triggered the disputes, would in most cases prevent abuse. In
situations where one could argue for flexibility in the application of the
general rules, it is likely that tribunals will require strong arguments for
exemptions to be accepted.
4.4.3 Refusing to Enforce or Satisfy Arbitral Awards
The difficulty in compelling a state to satisfy an international arbitral
award against it is a long-standing problem.101 What might be new or
98 Republic of Ecuador v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2012–5,
Award, 29 September 2012.
99 Chevron Corporation (USA) & Texaco Petroleum Company (USA) v. The Republic of
Ecuador (Chevron I), UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 34877, Award, 31 August 2011.
100 Chevron Corporation & Texaco Petroleum Corporation v. The Republic of Ecuador
(Chevron II), UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009–23, pending.
101 See 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
(New York Convention), 330 UNTS 38; 21 UST 2517; 7 ILM 1046 (1968).
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shifting is the means by which states are avoiding enforcement. One of
the central reasons driving the negotiation of the ICSID Convention in
the 1960s was precisely related to the problem of enforcement. Article 53
of the ICSID Convention attempted to resolve this problem by making
ICSID arbitration awards directly enforceable against the state.
The direct enforceability of awards under the ICSID Convention was
systemically challenged for the first time following Argentina’s finan-
cial collapse in 2001. Argentina has been steadfast in refusing to enforce
ICSID awards. The argument has been that despite reference to the direct
enforceability of awards in the ICSID Convention, the Argentinian con-
stitution requires that all payments out of the state treasury must first
be authorized through a domestic court judgment. Given the high num-
ber of ICSID awards against Argentina in the past ten years, this non-
compliance has put considerable strain on the long-term viability of the
regime overall. While Argentina has recently satisfied five of its outstand-
ing awards through a negotiated settlement, a number of final awards
remain unsatisfied.102
In addition to the Argentinian cases, Zimbabwe,103 Russia,104
Kyrgyzstan,105 Venezuela106 and Thailand107 have all refused to comply
102 Luke Peterson, ‘After Settling Some Awards, Argentina Takes More Fractious Path in
Bond-holders Case, with New Bid to Disqualify Arbitrators’ (Investment Arbitration
Reporter, 20 December 2013); Luke Peterson, ‘Argentina Announces Another Settlement
of Unpaid BIT Awards, Once Again at a Discount’ (Investment Arbitration Reporter,
15 May 2016).
103 Bernardus Henricus Funnekotter and others v. Republic of Zimbabwe, ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/6, Award, 22 April 2009.
104 Hulley Enterprises Limited (Cyprus) v. The Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, PCACaseNo.
AA 226, Award, 18 July 2014; Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of Man) v. The Russian Federa-
tion, UNCITRAL, PCACase No. AA 227, Award, 18 July 2014;Veteran Petroleum Limited
(Cyprus) v. The Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. AA 228, Award, 18 July
2014;Renta 4 S.V.S.A, Ahorro Corporación Emergentes F.I., Ahorro Corporación Eurofondo
F.I., Rovime Inversiones SICAV S.A., Quasar de Valors SICAV S.A., Orgor de Valores SICAV
S.A., GBI 9000 SICAV S.A. v. The Russian Federation, SCC, Case No. 24/2007, Award, 20
July 2012; RosInvest Co UK Ltd. v. The Russian Federation, SCC, Case No. V079/2005,
Award, 12 September 2010;Mr. Franz Sedelmayer v. The Russian Federation, SCC, Award,
7 July 1998.
105 Stans Energy v. Kyrgyz Republic, Moscow Chamber of Commerce and Industry (MCCI),
Award, 30 April 2014; OKKV (OKKB) and others v. Kyrgyz Republic, MCCI, Award,
21 November 2013; Lee John Beck & Central Asian Development Corporation v. Kyr-
gyz Republic, MCCI, Award, 13 November 2014; Sistem Mühendislik Ins¸aat Sanayi ve
Ticaret A.S¸. v. Kyrgyz Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/06/1, Award, 9 September 2009;
Petrobart Limited v. Kyrgyz Republic, SCC, Case No. 126/2003, Award, 29 March 2005.
106 All treaty-based arbitration awards based on Chavez-era nationalizations have not
been honoured to date. See Tenaris S.A. and Talta-Trading e Marketing Sociedade
Unipessoal Lda. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (Tenaris II), ICSID Case No.
ARB/11/26, Award, 12 December 2016; Rusoro Mining Ltd. v. Bolivarian Republic
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with any awards rendered against them.108 In addition, there are a number
of respondent states that have sought to delay or refuse enforcement in
individual cases: Guatemala,109 Libya,110 Kazakhstan,111 Mexico112 and
Romania.113 These states have a record of complying with some awards
and rigorously fighting enforcement in others.
The above list of states includes none from North America and West-
ern Europe. However, there is one case that illustrates that refusal to
enforce awards may be relevant for such states – at least EU states.
In Micula v. Romania,114 a group of foreign investors initiated a claim
under the Sweden-Romania BIT alleging that Romania withdrew a num-
ber of incentives in breach of the BIT. The European Commission (EC)
intervened as amicus curiae expressing doubts as to whether an ICSID
award against Romania would be enforceable. Nonetheless, on 11 Decem-
ber 2013, the tribunal issued a final award against Romania in the
amount of US$250 million. In April 2014, Romania initiated annulment
proceedings, but ultimately failed in annulling the result.115 In May 2014,
of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/5, Award, 22 August 2016; Vestey Group
Ltd. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/4, Award, 15 April
2016; Crystallex International Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case
No. ARB(AF)/11/2, Award, 14 April 2016; Tenaris S.A. and Talta-Trading e Marketing
Sociedade Unipessoal Lda. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (Tenaris I), ICSID Case No.
ARB/11/26, Award 29 January 2016; Tidewater Investment SRL and Tidewater Caribe C.A.
v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/5, Award 13 March 2015;
OI European Group B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/25,
Award, 10 March 2015; Flughafen Zürich A.G. and Gestión e Ingeniería IDC S.A. v. Boli-
varian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/19, Award, 18 November 2014;
Venezuela Holdings B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27,
Award, 9 October 2014; Gold Reserve Inc. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case
No. ARB(AF)/09/1, Award, 22 September 2014.
107 Walter Bau A.G. v. Kingdom of Thailand, UNCITRAL, Award, 1 July 2009.
108 The cases listed in this section are limited to treaty-based investment claims (andmay not
be exhaustive). In addition to the states listed, there are a few states that have not enforced
contract-based investment claims or have not complied with settlement agreements. Pri-
marily, these include Lao PDR, the Dominican Republic, the Democratic Republic of
Congo, Ukraine and Turkmenistan.
109 Railroad Development Corporation v. Republic of Guatemala, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/
23, Award, 29 June 2012.
110 Mohamed Abdulmohsen Al-Kharafi and Sons Co. v. Libya, CRCICA, Award, 22 March
2013.
111 Rumeli Telekom A.S. and Telsim Mobil Telekomunikasyon Hizmetleri A.S. v. Republic of
Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/16, Award, 29 July 2008.
112 Cargill Incorporated v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/05/2, Award,
18 September 2009.
113 Ioan Micula, Viorel Micula and others v. Romania (Micula), ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20,
Award, 11 December 2013.
114 Ibid. 115 Micula, Decision on Annulment, 26 February 2016.
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the EC formally enjoined Romania from satisfying the ICSID award.116
The EC claims that the ICSID award is compensation for incentives that
Romania had to remove in order to join the EU. These incentives consti-
tuted illegal state aid under the EU; and therefore, as the EC argues, any
payment of compensation for the withdrawal of such illegal state aid (i.e.
the ICSID award) would be considered illegal state aid itself and therefore
unenforceable.117
4.4.5 Concluding Remarks
While some tactics used by respondent states can be highly obstructionist
in effect, many simply mirror those adopted by foreign investors. How-
ever, more recently, and directly related to the expansion of ITA, respon-
dent states are also using their sovereign position to fight claims. It is
also becoming apparent that the more experienced a state is in defending
against investment treaty claims, the more sophisticated (and less defer-
ential to its power as a state) it becomes in its litigation tactics.While some
of these tactics will have both material and symbolic effects, it is the latter
that are likely to have the most influence on the system. Certain tactics
may not have many material consequences beyond the specific dispute;
but collectively, the various tactics we have explored may have significant
effect on the way that investment treaty arbitration is perceived. Potential
litigants may think twice before bringing a case. And states may have a
strong interest in making system watchers aware of the burden that these
cases place on them.
Evenmore profound, however, is the increasing acceptability of respon-
dent state litigation tactics that can be classified as abusing their position
as sovereign. For a few states, such tactics are part of their overall strat-
egy to oppose the international investment regime, perhaps qualifying as
‘absolute opponents’ who aim at exiting the regime. However, most states
applying such tactics do so in an ad hoc manner, and should rather be
classified as ‘reluctant compliers’.Moreover, it remains unclear how the tri-
bunals will respond to the increasingly strong litigation tactics employed
by some states. Therefore, it is still too early to tell what impact litigation
tactics will have on the international investment regime as such.
116 Letter from the European Commission 26 May 2014, as confirmed in: European Com-
mission State Aid Investigation, State aid SA.38517(2014/C) (ex 2014/NN) – Romania
Implementation of Arbitral award Micula v. Romania of 11 December 2013, 1 October
2014.
117 Ibid.
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4.5 Conclusion
Considering the current field of international investment law, it is easy to
forget the fact that states have voluntarily consented to being bound by the
provisions of the IIAs and that they have voluntarily accepted that such
obligations can be adjudicated and enforced through mandatory ISDS
provisions. In that sense, all participating states start out as compliers to
the IIAs to which they are parties.
This chapter has suggested that when states become dissatisfied with
aspects of their IIAs, they may become ‘reluctant compliers’,118 ‘principled
opponents’,119 and occasionally ‘absolute opponents’;120 and it is these dis-
tinct choices that frame the type of tactics that a state chooses to pursue its
aims. It should be noted however, that while there is a significant shift in
the tactics that states are pursing to increase sovereign manoeuvrability,
no state to date has completely exited from the international investment
regime. As such, this means that the strategy employed to date fits within
the general thesis of this volume: states continue to engage with – and be a
participant in – an increasingly legalized international landscape – while
at the same time making adjustments that attempt to minimize the effects
on their on sovereign discretion. However, we have shown that the exist-
ing web of IIAs has a high degree of ‘stickiness’ and that some states have
faced significant delays in their efforts to exit or change their obligations.
The regime is thus designed in a manner to constrain such state strate-
gies. We have also suggested that certain tactics may be pursued through
two principal avenues: states acting ‘as principals’ and states acting ‘as lit-
igants’, and it is clear that states have the ability to modify and influence
the international regimes to which they have consented.
It is possible also that these strategies have had some success. Elsewhere,
Langford and Behn have analyzed whether the backlash has affected out-
comes in investment arbitration.121 There was a clear and early drop in
success ratios after the emergence of the legitimacy crisis discourse and
success in jurisdictional claims has declined over time. The multivariate
118 Arguably, the following states could be considered to be in the process of becoming ‘reluc-
tant compliers’, based on our findings above: Argentina, Bolivia, Indonesia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Thailand and Zimbabwe.
119 Arguably, the following states could be considered to be in the process of becoming ‘prin-
cipled opponents’, based on our findings above: Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, the Czech
Republic, Ecuador, Indonesia, South Africa and Zimbabwe.
120 States qualifying as both ‘reluctant compliers’ and ‘principled opponents’ may be classified
as ‘absolute opponents’. This could apply to Argentina, Bolivia, Indonesia and Zimbabwe.
121 Malcolm Langford and Daniel Behn, ‘Managing Backlash: The Evolving Investment
Treaty Arbitrator’ (forthcoming) European Journal of International Law.
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Figure 4.3 Claimant–investor success ratios (by year)
Extracted fromMalcolm Langford and Daniel Behn, ‘Managing Backlash: The Evolving
Investment Treaty Arbitrator’ (forthcoming) European Journal of International Law.
analysis finds that some of this drop could be attributed to the backlash.
However, the recalibration in outcomes for investors should not necessar-
ily be viewed with great alarm. Success rates are much higher for investor
claimants than human rights claimants in international and regional adju-
dicative bodies (Figure 4.3).
Why are states employing these strategies? Their invocation of legiti-
macy concerns with IIAs and ISDS arguably has some basis and their tac-
tics cannot be reduced to a kneejerk sovereignty or realist reflex: that states
never intended to cede sovereignty and that treaty commitment consti-
tutes a false positive. It is true that one of the main concerns that states
express about IIAs is their potential to interfere with domestic policy and
the ability of the state to regulate in the public interest,122 even if the IIAs
manifest the states’ sovereign ability to advance another public interest:
the long-term policy goal of economic development through the promo-
tion of foreign direct investment.
A more nuanced approach comes from rational choice theories which
highlight the incentives and constraints for states in entering the regime.
In the case of the international investment regime, states may balance:
(1) making credible commitments in order to gain investment versus
ensuring sufficient legal certainty over the potential costs of commitment;
and (2) the likelihood that they will be predominantly capital exporters
or importers in the future. The existence of these two uncertainties means
122 David Schneiderman, Constitutionalizing Economic Globalization: Investment Rules and
Democracy’s Promise (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
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that states may need to ensure sufficient flexibility in regime design (or
impose it later) to be able to respond if the basis for these trade-offs
changes.
Arguably, these calculations were also affected by certain background
institutional, legal and political conditions that fostered ready commit-
ment yet turned out to be highly fragile in practice. First, IIAs were an easy
and attractive to sign.Only two states were required for an agreement, par-
liamentary assent was often not required, and the whole event provided
a perfect media event for visiting heads of state. Secondly, the pedigree
of many of these treaties can be traced to a small number of model BITs
developed by a few capital-exporting states in the 1980s and 1990s. There-
fore, while each BIT should be viewed as a distinct and negotiated docu-
ment between two states, the reality is that many BITs are very similar in
the rights granted and – until the mid 1990s – do not appear to be the
result of hard fought negotiation, but rather were often signed with little
or no change from the capital-exporting states’ model. Thirdly, the ideo-
logical climate at the domestic and international level has also shifted with
a partial pushback in the last decade against the march of global neolib-
eralism. In the 1990s, UNCTAD recorded that 90 per cent of regulatory
reforms concerning investment inflows were pro-liberalization while that
figure fell to less than 70 per cent in 2009 – one-third were restrictive.
Thus, one way of understanding the current backlash is that states are
reassessing the actual and perceived utility of the treaties.123 As the prac-
tice of investment treaty arbitration develops, originally unanticipated
consequences have become clearer. The importance of mandatory ISDS
provisions in IIAs as a means to challenge policies that foreign investors
view as detrimental to their interests has become clearer to many states.
Moreover, there have been significant shifts in stocks and flows of foreign
direct investment in recent decades changing the nature of capital exporter
and importer states.124 The state – as the primary mover in consenting to
international treaties – can assert its sovereign authority by modifying or
exiting regimes that are no longer perceived to be in that state’s interests.
Provided sufficient knowledge, whether IIAs remain a benefit to the state
can be subjected to a cost-benefit analysis. For some states, it is clear that
the costs do outweigh the benefits; and in coming to this realization they
are likely to design strategies and tactics to remedy the imbalance.125 In
123 See e.g. Lavopa, Barreiros and Bruno, note 24 above.
124 See World Investment Report 2015: Reforming International Investment Governance
(Geneva: UNCTAD, 2015).
125 At the time the vast majority of these treaties were signed, there was very little precedent
on how the ISDS provisions would operate in practice: through the 1980s, there were only
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this respect, we should be cautious about treating all international treaties
as comparable, as is partly done in this volume. The logic of an invest-
ment treaty is partly different than a human rights treaty. The former is
partly about fundamental protections but it is also deeply grounded in
reciprocity and strategic economic policy choices.
In short, there are many reasons why we are seeing a backlash against
the extensive web of IIAs that were signed during the last decades of
the twentieth century. Commentators and negotiators talk about new
‘generations’ of treaties that seek to redefine the balance between rights
of investors and policy freedom of states, as well as the role of ISDS. How-
ever, in this chapter, we do not comment on whether states are morally
right in engaging in this strategic behaviour as principals or litigants. The
legitimacy or justice of such state action is the subject of a burgeoning and
heated literature. Nonetheless, we could find broader agreement that liti-
gation tactics that involve states abusing their sovereign position are par-
ticularly problematic. The use of domestic criminal proceedings during
disputes, refusals to comply with awards, and attempts to change treaties
after a dispute is filed reveal not only an infidelity by states to their treaty
commitments but a failure to respect the international rule of law.
Postscript
In mid-2017, Ecuador announced that it would be withdrawing from all
of its remaining IIAs in force. While there is no indication that this with-
drawal has formally taken place yet, but when and if Ecuador follows
through with its intention to do so, it will be the first and only state to
have fully exited from the international investment regime. We also draw
attention to the new reform process facilitated by UNCITRAL, which is
to address concerns with ISDS and propose possible reforms. The work-
ing group sessions in late 2017 revealed many of the splits amongst states
identified in this chapter but also create the possibility for a multi-state
response to legitimacy crisis.∗
a handful of ITAs that had been initiated.While the modern investment treaty regime has
its roots in the customary international law on the treatment of aliens, its specific develop-
ment as a means of protecting and promoting foreign investment is a relatively new phe-
nomenon that is frequently said to date from the signing of the first BIT between Pakistan
and Germany in 1959. However, this BIT did not include any dispute settlement mech-
anism and instead could be viewed as a largely aspirational statement about the future
cooperation between states on the promotion of foreign investment. It was not until 10
years later, in 1969, that the first BIT with ISDS was signed.
∗ See Anthea Roberts, ‘UNCITRAL and ISDS Reform: Not Business as Usual’, EJIL:Talk!,
11 December 2017.
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